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HILBERT’S INFERNO: TIME TRAVEL FOR THE DAMNED.* 
 
Abstract: 
Combining time travel with certain kinds of supertask, this paper proposes a novel 
model for Hell.  Temporally-closed spacetimes allow otherwise impossible 
opportunities for material kinds of damnation and reveal surprising limitations on 
metaphysical objections to Hell.  Prima facie, eternal damnation requires either 
infinite amounts of time or time for the damned to speed-up arbitrarily.  However, 
spatiotemporally finite ‘time travel’ universes can host unending personal torment 
for infinitely many physical beings, while keeping fixed finite limits on rates of 
temporal passage.  Such ‘Hilbert’s Inferno’ spacetimes suggest neither materialism 
nor the finitude of time and space need forbid Hell.  A material Hell can be 
spatiotemporally finite yet eternal for its inhabitants.  Hilbert’s Inferno also sheds 
light on Hell’s location and accessibility, and shows that some spacetimes are 
intrinsically better suited to punishment than reward. 
Key words: time travel, supertasks, Zeno, damnation. 
 
I)  Introduction 
While the impact of Big Bang cosmology on First Cause arguments has been much 
debated,1 discussions that otherwise combine philosophy of religion and philosophy 
of space and time are rather rare.2  This is unfortunate, because eschatology and 
philosophy of space and time can be mutually illuminating.  For example, living 
forever appears impossible if time is finite.  However, spacetime eschatology can 
offer counter-examples to many normally compelling generalisations.  In particular, 
the feasibility and location of Hell receive unexpected twists if physical eschatology 
includes spacetimes with unusual causal structures.  Hell could be purely material, 
with finite spatiotemporal extent and a fixed rate of temporal passage, yet still house 
                                                 
* Many thanks to Hud Hudson, Roy Sorensen and an anonymous referee for Ratio for comments on 
earlier versions of this paper.  A preliminary version of this paper was produced during a year-long 
sabbatical which was supported by a research award from the Arts and Humanities Research Council, 
to whom I owe many thanks. 
1See (e.g.) Quentin Smith, ‘Stephen Hawking’s Cosmology and Theism’, Analysis, Vol. 54, 1994, pp. 
236-43, John Earman, Bangs, Crunches, Whimpers and Shrieks: Singularities and Acausalities in 
Relativistic Spacetimes, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, Ch. 7, Section 4, pp. 207-10, and 
William Lane Craig, ‘Hartle-Hawking Cosmology and Atheism’, Analysis Vol. 57, 1997, pp. 291-95. 
2Rare, but not unknown  - see for example Hud Hudson’s excellent The Metaphysics of Hyperspace, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, especially chapters 7 and 8, pp. 163-204. 
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infinitely many damned for an eternity of their time.  Metaphysical arguments against 
damnation must do more than establish that time and space are finite. 
 Can Hell be a physical place even if space and time are finite?  If Hell was a 
physical place, would it be detectable?   How might the spaces and times of the 
damned relate to those of the saved?  The following (admittedly highly) speculative 
exercise in physical eschatology explores these questions by considering a 
temporally-closed (‘time travel’) spacetime as a model Hell.  Time-travel spacetimes 
widen the conceptual space for physical Hells and allow otherwise impossible 
outcomes.  Our model Hell requires two counterfactual conditions: i) time is closed, 
and ii) space and matter are arbitrarily divisible along one dimension.  Given these 
conditions, spatiotemporally finite Hells can hold all the (personally) infinite futures 
of infinitely many material damned beings.  Indeed, such Hells can do so even if time 
consists of indivisible atomic units and passes at the same rate for all observers.  
II)  The Structure of Hilbert’s Inferno 
To dramatise time travel’s eschatological possibilities, imagine you are a demon 
tasked with tormenting legions of the damned forever.  Your task faces certain 
restrictions.  Firstly, the damned are extended material beings.  Secondly, you must 
accept infinitely many damned.  Thirdly, your inferno is spatiotemporally finite.  
Fourthly, rates of temporal passage are either constant for all observers or at most can 
only diverge within finite bounds, (e.g. so you can’t give some observers an infinite 
duration in a finite interval of other observers’ time simply by making time pass ever-
faster for the former observers).3  Can an inferno meeting these desiderata 
                                                 
3Like Roy Sorensen’s ‘pseudo-immortals’, whose personal rate of temporal passage comes to diverge 
exponentially from that of external time so they live an infinite personal duration in a finite external 
time.  See ‘The Cheated God: Death and Personal Time’, Analysis, Vol. 65, 2005, pp. 119-125.  More 
on personal time and its relationship to time travel in section III. 
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accommodate infinitely many physical damned forever?  Yes, provided i) space and 
matter are arbitrarily divisible in one dimension, and ii) time itself is closed. 
 Our model Hell is a time travel spacetime.  The easiest time travel spacetime to 
picture (although not the most physically realistic) is an otherwise ordinary (e.g. 
Minkowski) spacetime wherein two complete timeslices are identified.  Such 
identification gives spacetime a closed time co-ordinate.  Our closed-time universe 
has three spatial dimensions and one time dimension but it can be pictured as the two-
dimensional surface of a cylinder, where space is the linear axis and time the closed 
axis.  As an object persists over time, it progresses its way around the ‘cylinder’, 
(figure after Earman 1995, p. 214, fig. 7.1):  
 
 An object that moved only in time (i.e. suffered no spatial displacement) would 
eventually persist its way around the cylinder’s (finite) circumference and right back 
into becoming its own earlier self.  Any physically realistic self-becoming ‘object 
loop’ would present a host of difficulties concerning (e.g.) apparent reversals of 
entropy, restoration of lost parts, undoing of aging effects, etc.4  However, our Hell 
requires no self-becoming objects and not every object in temporally-closed 
spacetimes must turn back into its earlier self.  A traveller can avoid object-looping 
simply by moving correctly.  Indeed, a moving object in a cylindrical universe can 
recede to arbitrarily-great spatial distances from its starting point, encountering every 
                                                 
4For more on object loops, see Richard Hanley, ‘No End In Sight: Causal Loops in Philosophy, Physics 
and Fiction’, Synthese, Vol. 141, 2004, pp. 123-152. 
t 
t1 
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global timeslice (e.g. t1) arbitrarily many times en route.  So spacetime paths of 
infinite length (and hence duration) are possible even if time itself is finite and closed. 
 Granted, objects can follow spacetime paths (or ‘worldlines’) of infinite length in 
temporally finite (i.e. closed-time) worlds.  However, objects with fixed non-zero 
velocity can only follow infinite worldlines in spatially infinite cylindrical universes.  
Still, an object’s prospects for eternal survival in finite cylindrical spacetimes improve 
if its velocity and length can both approach arbitrarily closely to zero.  For example, 
imagine an object’s length and velocity both halve at regular intervals.  Objects which 
contract and slow in such a fixed Zeno-style geometric series can follow infinite 
worldlines in cylindrical universes of overall spatiotemporally finite dimensions. 
 Suppose a damned person (‘Faustus-1’) starts off from point q on timeslice t1 in 
our cylindrical spacetime.  Faustus-1 leaves q with finite velocity5 and a finite length 
equal to d (measured along Faustus-1’s direction of travel).  Ordinary persistence will 
bring Faustus-1 round to t1 again.  While winding around the cylinder, Faustus-1 
contracts along the direction of motion (although in no other direction), getting 
arbitrarily shorter as the number of circuits increases.  Faustus-1’s velocity and linear 
extension shrink by half during the first circuit around the cylinder, so Faustus-1 re-
encounters t1 with length d/2.  As circuit #2 ends, Faustus-1 is d/4 long, and so on.  
Faustus-1’s length progressively diminishes, equalling d/2n as circuit number n ends.  
This ever-slower and ever-narrower winding means each of Faustus-1’s circuits 
occupies progressively smaller spatial distance.  Thus, Faustus-1’s front 
asymptotically approaches a point 2d away from q, while its front and back 
                                                 
5A Faustus that began with, or accelerated to, unbounded velocity could escape ‘to infinity’ without 
ever intersecting its starting timeslice again.  See John Earman on classical ‘escape particles’ that 
disappear from space in finite time, (A Primer on Determinism, Dordrecht, D. Reidel, 1986, pp. 34-5). 
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extremities draw asymptotically closer together.  Like loops of thread wound around a 
bobbin, all Faustus-1’s (infinitely many) stages can be physically contiguous with 
their immediate successors.  Given correct contraction and deceleration, Faustus-1’s 
worldline can be infinitely long yet fit into a spatial interval no more than 2d across. 
 Our next damned being, Faustus-2, starts off 2d away from q with the same finite 
velocity as Faustus-1 but with length d/2, (i.e. half that of Faustus-1).   Faustus-2’s 
length and velocity again diminish Zeno-style, but this time, the total infinite 
worldline fits into a spatial interval no longer than d.  Faustus-3 starts off 3d away 
from q with length d/4 but otherwise proceeds as above, so has a total worldline 
occupying an interval no more than d/2.  And so on, ad infinitum.  Measured along the 
direction of travel, a spatial interval no longer than 4d can hold infinitely many 
damned.  The total spatiotemporal volume swept out by Faustus-1 is topologically 
open towards the direction of motion, i.e. there is no last circuit.6  Just as each Faustus 
worldline makes a topologically open spacetime object, so does the total set of all the 
Faustus family.  Each Faustus has infinitely many successors and each stage of each 
Faustus has infinitely many successors.  (So there is no last Faustus.)  Call the Faustus 
family’s spacetime ‘Hilbert’s Inferno’ for short.  Just as Hilbert’s Hotel holds 
(countably) infinitely many guests, Hilbert’s Inferno can hold (countably) infinitely 
many damned.7  Below, a schematic of Hilbert’s Inferno in simply connected (i.e. 
‘unwound’ or unrolled) form, plotting personal time against spatial distance travelled: 
                                                 
6Each Faustus worldline forms a spacetime version of what Simon Prosser calls a ‘Zeno object’, i.e. an 
object of finite overall dimensions which lacks at least one boundary - see ‘Zeno Objects and 
Supervenience’, Analysis, Vol. 69, 2009, pp.18-26. 
7Cf. Rudy Rucker’s variant of Hilbert’s Hotel, which packs infinitely many floors into a total height of 
thirty feet.  In Rucker’s Hotel, the ground floor is ten feet tall and every subsequent floor is two-thirds 
as tall as the floor below.  See Infinity and the Mind, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1997, p. 73. 
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 While personal time increases along Faustus-1’s worldline without limit, this 
worldline nonetheless tends to a definite spatial limit, i.e. a distance 2d from q.  
Likewise, Faustus-2 asymptotically approaches a distance 3d from q as personal time 
blows up, and so on – each of the damned has its own unique distance from q to 
which it tends in the limit as personal time tends to infinity.  None of the vertical 
dotted lines above marks an achievable destination for any Faustus – rather than 
marking an end-point to any worldline, each such line instead marks a limit towards 
which a given damned being’s worldline will tend as arbitrarily great personal time 
elapses.  Hence 2d really marks the first point beyond Faustus-1’s worldline rather 
than any point thereon.  Faustus-1’s worldline has no stage at 2d, and Faustus-2’s 
worldline never intersects 3d, etc.  Hence the half-open interval [q, 2d) contains all of 
Faustus-1’s worldline, Faustus-2’s worldline will fit entirely into [2d, 3d) and all 
infinitely many damned in the Faustus series fit into [q, 4d).  No Faustus worldline 
actually reaches the suppositional limit at 4d.  (Any Faustus that occupied the 4d line 
would form a finite object loop.)  So Hilbert’s Inferno holds infinitely many 
worldlines, each infinitely long, and yet has only finite spatiotemporal volume. 
Space 
q         d      2d           3d  3.5d  4d 
… 
F-1    F-2   F-3   … 
∞ Personal 
 time 
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 All our damned only diminish to arbitrarily small length after arbitrarily great 
personal time has elapsed – after no finite interval of personal time do any damned 
reach literally zero length.  Also, our damned contract only along their direction of 
travel – their extension in other spatial dimensions is unaffected.  If Faustus-1 starts 
out spatially three-dimensional, it would take infinite elapsed personal time for 
Faustus-1 to become literally two-dimensional.  Just as the career of any Faustus has 
no end, so the length of any Faustus, howsoever small initially, never becomes nil. 
  Just as achieved zero length is always an infinite number of iterations away in 
damned personal time, at no point can any of our damned look back upon a literal 
eternity of elapsed personal time.  Measured in damned personal time, Hilbert’s 
Inferno does not allow the completion of a traditional supertask, i.e. at no point in 
personal time can any Faustus look back over a completed infinity of moments or sub-
tasks.  Rather, points along the career of a Faustus are only surveyable in finite time 
for external observers – for the damned, their careers are strictly and literally endless.  
Rather than unbounded velocities or accelerations, Hilbert’s Inferno requires 
unlimited compression and progressively slower motion instead.  (While quantum 
physics forbids arbitrarily fine-grained physical differences and relativity forbids 
faster-than-light transmission of mass-energy, neither forbids arbitrarily slow motion.)  
Again, the damned tend only asymptotically to literally zero velocity – it would take 
infinite personal time for any Faustus to come to a complete standstill. 
 Prima facie, each Faustus approaches literal rest and zero length as Zeno’s 
Achilles approaches his quarry, i.e. via a geometrical series that takes infinitely many 
steps to complete.  However, the two cases differ significantly: where Achilles 
supposedly packs infinitely many sub-runs into a finite time simpliciter (i.e. measured 
by Achilles or anybody else), the stages in the shortening and slowing of a Faustus 
Hilbert’s Inferno: Time Travel for the Damned. 
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require infinite (personal) time.  If Achilles’ run really comprised infinitely many sub-
runs, his catching his quarry in finite time would be a supertask in any frame of 
reference – the task’s duration is finite for Achilles or anybody else.  Hence Achilles’ 
supertask (if such it be) is observer-independent.  However, any Faustus can perform 
only a perspective-relative ‘bifurcated’ supertask.8 
 Non-bifurcated supertasks involve completing infinitely many sub-tasks in a finite 
interval of anybody’s time (observer or performer), whereas with bifurcated 
supertasks, infinitely many sub-tasks occupy finite time for an observer but infinite 
time for their performers.  Suppose Faustus-1 is told to count all the even integers 
without enumerating them progressively faster – because of the unusual structure of 
Hilbert’s Inferno, such a task could fit into finite external time but would take infinite 
time for Faustus-1.  Hence any worries about what state Faustus-1 is in after the task 
are misplaced: there is an ‘outside’ the task but there is no ‘after’.  For its hapless 
performer, there is nothing super about a bifurcated supertask, since it takes a literal 
eternity of the performer’s time.  There is no last circuit of Hilbert’s Inferno for any of 
our damned and no terminus for their finitely bounded but unending worldlines.  
While any Faustus worldline has sharply differing durations measured externally or 
by a Faustus, not all properties of Hilbert’s Inferno are perspectival or observer-
relative – notably, all Faustus worldlines are genuinely endless for damned and 
external observers alike. 
III)  Three Definitions of Time Travel 
Assuming for now our Faustus series are eternally damned, are they really time 
travellers?  Philosophers and physicists offer three major definitions of time travel, 
which invoke a) durational discrepancies, b) closed timelike curves and/or c) multiple 
                                                 
8See John Earman and John Norton, ‘Infinite Pains: the Trouble with Supertasks’, Benacerraf and His 
Critics, A. Morton and S. Stich (eds.), Oxford, Blackwell, 1996, pp. 231-61, especially pp. 232 ff. 
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simultaneous locations of the traveller.  First, consider David Lewis’s ‘durational 
discrepancy’ definition, part of Lewis’s thoroughgoing defence of the logical 
possibility of time travel and perhaps the most useful definition to date: 
What is time travel?  Inevitably, it involves discrepancy between time and time.  
Any traveler departs and then arrives at his destination; the time elapsed from 
departure to arrival (positive, or perhaps zero) is the duration of the journey.  But 
if he is a time traveler, the separation in time between departure and arrival does 
not equal the duration of the journey.9 
Hence, by Lewis’s (1976) definition, a time traveller is one whose journey has 
different durations in personal and external time.  ‘Personal’ time is time as registered 
by a travelling object, whereas external time is time as it elapses in the outside world: 
“External time is simply time itself.  Personal time is […] the way in which time is 
registered by a given object: a heart beating, hair growing, a minute hand moving, a 
candle burning”.10  Clearly, points more than one circuit apart on Faustus’s worldline 
are separated by greater personal than external duration, and on each Faustus 
worldline, there are stretches where personally later events correspond to externally 
earlier times.  (In Hilbert’s Inferno, personal time can be open and infinite but 
external time is finite and closed.)  Hence each Faustus exhibits the personal/external 
duration discrepancy Lewis held definitive of time travel.  Indeed, Faustus worldlines 
represent a logical extremity of personal/external time discrepancy, since points 
thereon which are simultaneous in external time (e.g. along t1) can be arbitrarily far 
apart in personal time.  While the duration of a Faustus-style journey differs from the 
perspective of a Faustus or an external observer, there is no reason in principle why 
the rate of temporal passage should differ between observers – Hilbert’s Inferno does 
not require time to elapse at different rates for different observers (whether via time 
                                                 
9‘The Paradoxes of Time Travel’, American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 13, 1976, pp. 145-152, p. 
145. 
10Robin Le Poidevin, ‘The Cheshire Cat Problem and Other Spatial Obstacles to Backwards Time 
Travel’, The Monist, Vol. 88, 2005, (pp. 336-352), p. 339. 
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dilation or otherwise), and the requisite time travel is achieved purely through 
geometric identification of distinct timeslices.  While Hilbert’s Inferno allows one and 
the same journey to have divergent durations in personal or external time, it can still 
function as a model Hell even if time elapses at the same rate for all observers. 
 Second, consider David Malament’s geometrical ‘closed timelike curve’ definition: 
I take ‘time travel’ to be nothing more, and nothing less, than the act of starting at 
a particular point in spacetime, taking an otherwise conventional trip, and 
somehow returning to (or close to) that very point. … In geometric terms, my time 
traveler is simply one whose worldline is closed (or almost closed).11 
‘Otherwise conventional’ here means always keeping below the (local) speed of light.  
Every Faustus begins with finite velocity and thereafter progressively slows down.  
Hilbert’s Inferno has closed timelike curves throughout its extent and it lets each 
successor-stage of Faustus-1 (and each successor-stage of every succeeding Faustus) 
approach its immediate predecessor as closely as physical contiguity permits. 
 Thirdly, perhaps objects time-travel if different temporal stages of them can be 
present at the same global time.  Only time travel seems to allow the same concrete 
object to have distinct temporal stages simultaneously present.  Such a ‘Multiple 
location’ definition of backward time travel can be derived from David Deutsch: “In 
past-directed time travel the traveller experiences the same instant, as defined by 
external clocks and calendars, more than once in subjective succession”.12  Thus, by 
Deutsch’s (1997) criterion, a time-traveller is a concrete object entirely present in 
multiple instantiations on a single global timeslice.  Hilbert’s Inferno offers ‘multiple 
location’ deluxe, since therein infinitely many persons are wholly present infinitely 
many times on every global timeslice. 
                                                 
11David Malament, ‘“Time Travel” in the Gödel Universe’, PSA: Proceedings of the Philosophy of 
Science Association, Vol. 2, 1984, pp. 91-100, p. 91. 
12David Deutsch, The Fabric of Reality, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1997, p. 319. 
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 These three definitions clearly differ.  The Lewis (1976) definition is the most 
inclusive, not least because it covers forward and backward time travel equally, and 
neither Malament’s (1984) nor Deutsch’s (1997) definitions readily lend themselves 
to forward time travel.  However these differences don’t matter greatly here because 
our damned count as time-travellers by all three definitions: i) exhibiting 
personal/external durational discrepancies, ii) traversing (nearly) closed timelike 
curves and iii) registering multiply on global timeslices. 
IV)  Cylindrical and Local Forms of Hilbert’s Inferno 
In the original cylindrical model spacetime above, it was assumed that complete 
timeslices were identified, i.e. that the whole spacetime was temporally closed.  One 
might worry that it was only by fiat that objects in our original cylindrical spacetime 
were assumed to maintain sufficient velocity that they didn’t form object loops (i.e. 
become their earlier selves).  After all, leave a stationary object long enough in a 
temporally rolled-up spacetime and it must form an object-loop.  One might also 
worry about how any temporally-closed ‘cylindrical’ spacetime can connect to a 
causally normal universe.  Both worries can be reduced if our temporally-closed Hell 
is simply a region formed by localised identification between spatially limited regions 
of two timeslices but residing in an otherwise causally normal universe: 
 
 Two localised regions of timeslices t1 and t2 are identified.  These regions look 
from outside as if they reside on separate timeslices but they are identical and will not 
Time 
Identify 
Forward  
Time travel 
t2 
t1 
A B 
Backward  
Time travel (1) 
t2 
t1 
C 
Space 
Backward  
Time travel (2) 
t2 
t1 
D 
… 
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appear separate to travellers who encounter them.   Consider four travellers A, B, C 
and D.  Travellers A and B have respectively zero and fixed finite velocity.  A and B 
encounter t1 from ‘below’ and exit instantaneously from t2.  Such travellers reach 
future external destinations in shorter external than personal time, hence travel 
forward in time by Lewis’s (1976) definition.  (Their worldlines only appear 
discontinuous from outside – the travellers experience no discontinuity.)  However, 
traveller C encounters t2 from below and exits instantaneously from t1 at an earlier 
external time.  (Indeed, C makes three such backward jumps in time.)  Traveller D 
begins with the same initial velocity as C but subsequently D’s velocity (and length if 
D is an extended object) halve at each transit of the time travel region in the familiar 
Faustus-style Zeno sequence.  Again, given correct deceleration and contraction, D 
can enter the time travel region but never thereafter emerge, i.e. D follows an infinite 
worldline in finite spatiotemporal volume.  (In a two- or three-dimensional space, 
travellers can enter the closed-time region ‘from the side’.) 
 In a local Hilbert’s Inferno, all of the infinitely many damned have infinite 
personal futures and yet face a definite finite limit to their travel into the external 
future – each Faustus will encounter timeslice t2 infinitely many times but no Faustus 
ever reaches an external time later than t2.  All the damned disappear from external 
history as of t2, and while they survive personally forever, there will be external times 
(perhaps distributed across an infinite external future) which they will never see. 
 There are physical advantages in Hilbert’s Inferno being a local time travel region 
in an otherwise normal universe: firstly, any non-moving traveller (like A) who 
encounters the local time travel region from outside through mere persistence cannot 
form an object loop.  (Indeed, no traveller who originates outside the time travel 
Hilbert’s Inferno: Time Travel for the Damned. 
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region can form an object loop.)  Secondly, the damned may enter a localised 
Hilbert’s Inferno without needing to leave their native spacetime, (e.g. via a wormhole 
or shortcut through higher-dimensional space).  If Hilbert’s Inferno resided in an 
otherwise normal spacetime, mere spatial movement might be all it took to enter Hell. 
V)  Hilbert’s Inferno as Hell 
Given the Faustus family qualify as time travellers, little further argument seems 
needed to establish that their fate is genuinely hellish.  All the damned in Hilbert’s 
Inferno face an infinitely long (personal) future of being compressed, ever more 
tightly, into a single contiguous mass with other stages of themselves.  Hilbert’s 
Inferno also has the dismaying feature that if the damned are at liberty to look ahead 
along their direction of travel, they can witness the succeeding stages in their own 
damnation and thus be continually presented with a reminder of the impossibility of 
escape – a refinement no causally normal Hell can seemingly offer.  Perhaps part of 
damnation for the Faustus family is that once damned, their free will is thereafter 
rescinded, since they are always given a view (not merely a vision) of their own 
irrevocable future.  The contiguity of each succeeding stage of each Faustus also 
presents the dismaying feature that any physical shock or impact (cries, lamentations 
etc.) felt/heard by any individual stage can potentially be transmitted to arbitrarily 
great personal distances.  All the Faustus family might spend eternity listening to a 
cacophony of their own making, (perhaps multiplied indefinitely in recollection too). 
 However, while each Faustus can be observed from without and each Faustus is 
brought into dismaying proximity with stages of itself, it is not clear how far any of 
the Faustus family can communicate with its successors or predecessors.  Each 
Faustus faces a definite spatial limit beyond which it will not travel.  Also, it is not at 
all clear what Faustus-1’s successors would see if they looked back at their 
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predecessors, since each predecessor has no last circuit of the spacetime in external or 
personal time.  Consider Faustus-2 looking back toward Faustus-1.  No stage of 
Faustus-1 ever reaches a point located beyond 2d from q but the worldline Faustus-1 
follows can be assumed continuous and hence should present a barrier to signals.  
However, there is no unique ‘last’ stage of Faustus-1 and hence no unique stage for 
any of the later damned to see.  So what, if anything, later members of the Faustus 
series could see if looking back at their predecessors is undetermined.13  
 Just as Hilbert’s Inferno offers endless multiplication of shocks and noises, it also 
permits a unique economy of effort for any attendant demons.  Suppose you wish to 
add to the torments of the damned by goading them with regular reminders of their 
plight.  Suppose a denunciation is affixed to a billboard and displayed for a short 
interval after t1.  Since t1 (like all global timeslices in Hilbert’s Inferno) will recur 
infinitely many times in the personal time of each and every Faustus, this single 
admonitory message can be viewed infinitely many times by each and every one of 
the infinitely many damned.  Of course, each of the damned will receive only a 
diminishing exposure to any light reflected from this denunciation.  But then again, 
the damned’s sense-organs presumably contract along the direction of travel too so 
their visual acuity may improve proportionally as they progress. 
 Any demons supervising a local Hilbert’s Inferno could have finite personal 
futures that nonetheless take them to external times after the eternal damnation of all 
their charges - a demon could ‘shadow’ its charges throughout their eternal damnation 
without spending infinite demonic time so doing, since in principle any point on an 
infinite Faustus worldline could be reached from outside in a finite amount of an 
                                                 
13For similar compositional problems with infinite objects, see John Hawthorne, ‘Before-Effect and 
Zeno Causality’, Noûs, Vol. 34, 2000, pp. 622-33. 
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external observer’s time.  Thus, one more dismaying feature to being in the Faustus 
series: one’s attendant demons could be present throughout one’s eternal damnation 
without being eternally damned themselves.  Being reminded that one’s attendant 
demon would be with one only for an eternity of one’s own time (i.e. not of the 
demon’s time) might be very disheartening.  Curiously, a local Hilbert’s Inferno 
embedded in a normal spacetime would allow demons to bestow eternal torments on 
the damned and yet leave room for said demons to be themselves redeemable. 
VI) Conclusions 
Hilbert’s Inferno seems a possible world and so logic permits (personally) eternal 
torment for each of infinitely many fully-physical damned in a finite spacetime 
wherein divergences in temporal passage remain within finite bounds.  If Hilbert’s 
Inferno is a possibility, what might this suggest about eschatological metaphysics?  
Prima facie, unending personal futures are hard to reconcile with metaphysical 
finitism.14  However, metaphysical finitism can take different forms.  If micro-
finitism and macro-finitism respectively reject infinite divisibility and actually infinite 
quantities, then Hilbert’s Inferno is not only compatible with macro-finitism about 
space, time and matter but with micro-finitism about time. Thus, Hilbert’s Inferno is 
still possible even if time itself is only finitely divisible.  Living an eternal life within 
a finite spacetime wherein time consists of finitely-sized atomic units (or ‘chronons’) 
seems highly counter-intuitive but Hilbert’s Inferno is chronon-compatible.15  
However, Hilbert’s Inferno is not compatible with micro-finitism about space or 
matter (i.e. with space or matter made of irreducible ‘atoms’ of fixed finite size).  So 
Hilbert’s Inferno is a possible world even if infinitely divisible time is forbidden and 
                                                 
14A sustained argument for metaphysical finitism is the centrepiece of A. W. Moore’s The Infinite, 
(London, Routledge, second edition 2001). 
15For chronons as the hypothetical indivisible minimum unit of time, see e.g. W. Newton-Smith, The 
Structure of Time, (London, Routledge, 1984), p. 115. 
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so are infinite quantities of matter, space and time.  Only micro-finitism about space 
seems to forbid Hilbert’s Inferno.  However, if a local Hilbert’s Inferno has arbitrarily 
great extent in one spatial dimension, the damned need not contract as they travel and 
their Hell could be both temporally localised and compatible with spatial micro-
finitism.  However while such a revised Hilbert’s Inferno could be temporally finite, it 
requires infinite spatial extent in at least one direction.  No Hilbert’s Inferno is 
compatible with both macro- and micro-finitism about space and time. 
 Following Lewis (1976), this discussion has taken the logical possibility of time 
travel as given and focussed on metaphysical and eschatological consequences of time 
travel.  Throughout, Hilbert’s Inferno has been considered as a possible material 
world.  But in what sense is Hilbert’s Inferno a ‘material’ world?  Hilbert’s Inferno is 
a highly idealised model, and only physically possible in a rather attenuated sense.  In 
particular, Hilbert’s Inferno is not compatible with our best physical theories in at 
least two respects, even given the significant concession that temporally closed 
spacetimes are physically possible.16  Firstly, Hilbert’s Inferno is not compatible with 
quantum minima for meaningful spatial intervals – which alone presumably stops 
Hilbert’s Inferno being governed by the same physical laws as we think govern our 
world.17  Secondly, Hilbert’s Inferno is not compatible with General Relativity either, 
in so far as General Relativity assumes that matter and spacetime interact 
dynamically. The spacetime structure of Hilbert’s Inferno must be non-dynamic, in 
                                                 
16For a thorough analysis of the physical possibility of time travel, see Douglas N. Kutach, ‘Time 
Travel and Consistency Constraints’, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 70 Supplement, 2003, pp. 1098-1113 
17As an anonymous referee for this journal helpfully pointed out, a local Hilbert’s Inferno joined to an 
otherwise normal spacetime poses problems in material constitution, identity-conditions and 
accessibility.  Certainly the human constitution would not survive arbitrary diminishment by halving 
even in one direction.  It would diminish any interest this model might possess if a literal miracle (qua 
suspension of the laws of nature) were required to ensure that any organism structured like ourselves 
could make the transition into a Hilbert’s Inferno region.  Such a need for external intervention would 
also suggest that even if a Hilbert’s Inferno region were physically accessible from a world like ours, it 
might not be nomologically so accessible. 
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that its spacetime background must stay fixed and not change as the distribution of 
matter changes. Allowing the spacetime background to respond to changes in matter-
distribution would be fatal to Hilbert’s Inferno, since each and every member of the 
Faustus family would then pack an (effectively) infinite mass into a finite 
spatiotemporal volume and behave like a black hole.  So Hilbert’s Inferno may not be 
a Hell acceptable to physicalists in that it seems to conflict with both of our best-
confirmed physical theories.  However, Hilbert’s Inferno might be acceptable to 
materialists in so far as all its constituent states of affairs supervene on physical facts, 
i.e. it requires no non-physical ‘Cartesian’ components. 
 Damnation might be rejected for ethical/theological reasons.  One might believe in 
universal salvation, whereby all are ultimately saved, or in conditional immortality, 
whereby only the saved inherit eternal life and the lost cease to exist at death.18  
Likewise, physical eschatology is presumably a branch of speculative metaphysics 
and one might reject damnation for non-finitist metaphysical reasons, e.g. thinking no 
realistic physical vehicle for consciousness seems plausibly immortal.  However, 
Hilbert’s Inferno shows that purely metaphysical arguments against damnation need 
more resources than either macro- or micro-finitism can offer independently.  
Hilbert’s Inferno is compatible with i)  finite space and time (i.e. spatiotemporal 
macro-finitism), ii) fixed finite upper bounds on the rate of temporal passage and iii) 
fixed finite minimal temporal intervals (i.e. temporal micro-finitism). 
 Perhaps eschatological states are necessarily non-physical and hence physical 
eschatology is at best otiose.  Then again, perhaps physical eschatology is 
theoretically acceptable but difficult to reconcile with observation or materialism.  
                                                 
18Hudson (2005 p. 184) suspects fewer theists believe in Hell than Heaven, citing “moral problems 
endangering the hypothesis of Hell that do not have counterparts (or else have less pressing 
counterparts) to threaten the hypothesis of Heaven”. 
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Hilbert’s Inferno at least suggests a purely material Hell can be eternal for the damned 
and yet finite overall.  Hilbert’s Inferno might also breathe new life into allegedly 
outmoded ‘regional’ or ‘receptacle’ conceptions of Hell whereby such eschatological 
states are physical locales or containers.  Hudson (2005, pp. 184-8) argues for 
regarding Heaven and Hell as spatiotemporal regions and not merely states of affairs 
or relations between minds.  However, ‘regional’ views seem hard to reconcile with 
the apparent absence of eschatological spaces from our well-observed physical 
neighbourhood, e.g. “the Hubble telescope has yet to photograph any pearly gates”, 
(Hudson, 2005, p. 186). 
 Hudson (2005) favours regarding eschatological places as real physical locations 
but ones which are separated from our local space by an extra spatial dimension.  
While Hudson’s (2005) hyperspace regional solution has much to commend it, 
Hilbert’s Inferno offers another kind of regional explanation as to whereabouts in 
space and whenabouts in time endless suffering might occur - since both Hilbert’s 
Inferno itself and any entrance to it could be arbitrarily small.  Likewise, if Hell-
mouth can be arbitrarily small, epistemic access to it is that bit easier to control.  If the 
damned are confined to a local Hilbert’s Inferno, their infinitely long personal futures 
will have finite bounds in external time, hence if the saved enjoy eternal futures in an 
infinite causally normal spacetime surrounding Hilbert’s Inferno, the eternal careers 
of damned and saved need not occupy co-extensive times.  In this case, the ‘falling 
away’ of the lost would involve a literal divergence from the careers of the saved, and 
the eternity of the blessed could extend infinitely after that of the damned.  Hence t2 
above would be an external temporal horizon to damnation and mean that the saved 
could not indefinitely contemplate the condition of the lost, nor vice versa – perhaps a 
merciful provision. 
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 Finally, Hilbert’s Inferno suggests an unsuspected eschatological asymmetry, 
namely that some spacetimes are intrinsically better-suited to supporting some 
eschatological states than others.  Whereas a spatiotemporally infinite universe seems 
equally amenable to hosting infinite bliss or infinite suffering, Hilbert’s Inferno seems 
vastly better suited to the latter.  Because the only infinite worldlines in Hilbert’s 
Inferno commit travellers to ever-greater compression, this spacetime seems 
intrinsically infernal, i.e. its very nature is better fitted to punishment than reward.  
Above, we imagined our damned as subject to the ministrations of demons but, 
provided correct contraction and slowing are maintained, the Faustus series could be 
literally self-tormenting.  Where Sartre’s Garcin and Marlowe’s Mephistopheles aver 
(respectively) that “L’Enfer, c’est les Autres” and “Hell hath no limits, nor is 
circumscrib’d / in one self-place”19, the hellishness of Hilbert’s Inferno consists 
precisely in the eternal persistence, ever more tightly circumscribed, of one’s self. 
                                                 
19Jean Paul Sartre, Huis Clos: Pièce En Un Acte, scène v, (London, Horizon, 1945, p. 59); Christopher 
Marlowe, The Tragical History of Doctor Faustus, (The B-Text, 1616), Act One, Scene 5, lines 117-8, 
(as in Christopher Marlowe – The Plays, edited by Emma Smith, Ware, Wordsworth, 2000, p. 223). 
